

**ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING
VIOLATIONS IN THE TERRITORY OF PROTECTED OBJECTS****Shokirov Farrukhbek Odiljon oglu,****independent researcher****University of Public Safety of the Republic of Uzbekistan**

Abstract: This article provides a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of mechanisms for preventing offences within the territory of guarded (secured) facilities from legal, organizational and practical perspectives. It first clarifies the core concepts of “guarded facility,” “critical infrastructure” and “security regime of guarded sites,” and evaluates the current national legislation and inter-agency regulations against clearly defined effectiveness criteria. Using offence statistics, field practices of guarding units, the scope of administrative powers vested in security personnel, and the level of information-analytical activity, the paper identifies the main factors that determine the performance of prevention mechanisms. Drawing on the experiences of France, Germany, Spain, Türkiye, Canada and the United States, it comparatively examines risk-based, threat-driven guarding models incorporating situational crime prevention, risk assessment, CPTED and “defensible space” principles. Based on the findings, the article formulates evidence-based recommendations for improving the prevention of offences at guarded facilities in Uzbekistan, including refinement of the legal status and administrative mandate of guarding services, strengthening inter-agency cooperation, modernizing technical and technological infrastructure, and enhancing the professional training of security personnel.

Keywords: guarded facility, prevention of offences, effectiveness analysis, critical infrastructure, guarding service, administrative jurisdiction, risk assessment, CPTED, public security.

**ҚЎРИҚЛАНАДИГАН ОБЪЕКТЛАР ҲУДУДИДА
ҲУҚУҚБУЗАРЛИКЛАРНИНГ ОЛДИНИ ОЛИШ МЕХАНИЗМЛАРИНИНГ
САМАРАДОРЛИГИ ТАҲЛИЛИ**

**Shokirov Farruxbek Odiljon o‘g‘li, mustaqil izlanuvchi
O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Jamoat xavfsizligi universiteti**

Аннотация: Мазкур мақолада қўриқланадиган объектлар ҳудудида ҳуқуқбузарликларнинг олдини олиш механизмларининг самарадорлиги ҳуқуқий, ташкилий ва амалий жиҳатдан комплекс таҳлил қилинади. Аввало “қўриқланадиган объект”, “критик инфратузилма”, “қўриқлаш хавфсизлик режими” каби базавий тушунчаларнинг мазмун-моҳияти ёритилиб, амалдаги миллий қонунчилик ва идоралараро меъёрий-ҳуқуқий ҳужжатлар самарадорлик мезонлари нуқтаи назаридан баҳоланади. Тадқиқотда ҳуқуқбузарликлар статистикаси, жойлардаги қўриқлаш амалиёти, қўриқлаш ходимларининг маъмурий ваколатлари ҳамда ахборот-таҳлилий фаолият даражаси ўртасидаги ўзаро боғлиқлик очиқ берилади. Франция, Германия, Испания, Туркия, Канада ва АҚШ каби ривожланган давлатлар тажрибаси мисолида хавф таҳлили, ризик-менежмент, CPTED ва “defensible space” тамойилларига асосланган қўриқлаш моделларининг натижавийлиги қиёсий тарзда ўрганилади. Олинган хулосалар асосида Ўзбекистонда қўриқланадиган объектлар ҳудудида ҳуқуқбузарликларни олдини олиш механизмларини такомиллаштириш бўйича қонунчиликка аниқ ўзгартишлар киритиш, идоралараро ҳамкорликни кучайтириш, техник-технологик инфратузилмани модернизация қилиш ҳамда кадрлар тайёргарлигини оширишга доир амалий таклиф ва тавсиялар ишлаб чиқилган.

Калит сўзлар: қўриқланадиган объект, ҳуқуқбузарликлар профилактикаси, самарадорлик таҳлили, критик инфратузилма, қўриқлаш хизмати, маъмурий юрисдикция, хавф таҳлили, CPTED, жамоат хавфсизлиги.

Аннотация: В статье проводится комплексный анализ эффективности механизмов предупреждения правонарушений на территории охраняемых объектов с правовых, организационных и практических позиций. Рассматриваются содержание базовых категорий – «охраняемый объект», «критическая инфраструктура», «режим безопасности охраняемых объектов», – а также дается оценка действующего национального законодательства и межведомственных нормативных актов с точки зрения их результативности. На основе изучения статистики правонарушений, особенностей охранной практики, объема административных полномочий сотрудников охраны и уровня информационно-аналитической деятельности выявляются ключевые факторы, влияющие на эффективность профилактики. На примере Франции, Германии, Испании, Турции, Канады и США анализируются модели охраны, основанные на риск-менеджменте, анализе

угроз, подходах CPTED и «защищаемого пространства». По результатам исследования сформулированы научно обоснованные предложения по совершенствованию механизмов предупреждения правонарушений на территории охраняемых объектов в Узбекистане, включая уточнение правового статуса охранной службы, развитие межведомственного взаимодействия, модернизацию технической инфраструктуры и повышение профессиональной подготовки кадров.

Ключевые слова: охраняемый объект, предупреждение правонарушений, анализ эффективности, критическая инфраструктура, охранная служба, административная юрисдикция, оценка рисков, CPTED, общественная безопасность.

In the current context of ensuring public safety and improving the prevention of offenses, the issue of reliably maintaining order and discipline within the territories of guarded facilities has acquired particular relevance. Processes of urbanization, the expansion of transport and energy infrastructure, and the growing number of facilities such as shopping centers, financial and credit institutions, industrial zones, and information and communication networks require protection against increasingly complex threats.

Assessing the effectiveness of mechanisms for preventing offenses within guarded facilities is, first and foremost, closely linked to the goals and tasks of security services. According to existing legislation, one of the key functions of security activities is maintaining public order within guarded facilities, preventing offenses, and suppressing them. This requires viewing security services not merely as entities that “combat” offenses, but as proactive “preventive actors.”

In evaluating the effectiveness of offense prevention mechanisms within guarded facilities, academic literature primarily applies three major theoretical approaches in an interconnected manner. These include: first, situational crime prevention aimed at “limiting opportunities”; second, the routine activity approach, which places the role of the “guardian (controller)” at the center; third, the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which reduces risks through environmental and architectural design.

In addition, the theory of administrative and legal regimes specific to guarded facilities integrates these approaches into the legal framework. The views of the scholars discussed below reveal the essence, practical effectiveness, and limitations of these mechanisms.

First of all, the situational crime prevention theory developed by R. Clarke is recognized as the most universal “practical boundary” for preventing offenses in guarded facilities. According to Clarke, the primary cause of an offense is not an individual’s “criminogenic inclination,” but rather the opportunities and favorable conditions created by a specific situation. Therefore, prevention is achieved by disrupting the chain of opportunities present in the environment. Clarke categorizes situational measures into five directions: increasing the difficulty of committing an offense, increasing the risk of detection, reducing rewards or benefits, reducing provocations, and eliminating rationalizations.

In our view, this approach integrates technological and regime-based measures specific to guarded facilities (such as control checkpoints, video surveillance, alarm systems, secure biometric access, facility isolation, and the visible presence of security personnel) into a unified preventive logic. This is because eliminating environmental opportunities is the central objective of security service activities.

The second important theoretical foundation is the routine activity approach developed by L. Cohen and M. Felson. They argue that three conditions must simultaneously exist for an offense to occur: a “motivated offender,” a “suitable target,” and the absence of a “capable guardian.” Accordingly, prevention primarily focuses on strengthening capable guardianship and making targets less attractive.

Felson and Clarke later developed this perspective further, emphasizing that opportunity constitutes the root cause of crime, and that the guardianship function should not rely solely on moral education or punishment, but must also be supported by environmental control mechanisms.

In our opinion, this theory provides a direct criterion for assessing the effectiveness of security services in guarded facilities: the higher the level of actual involvement of the guarding entity (security personnel, technical monitoring systems, dispatcher monitoring), the lower the likelihood of offenses occurring. In this context, the concept of a “guardian” encompasses not only personnel, but also cameras, alarm systems, automated notification systems, and even mutual surveillance among individuals present within the facility.

The third significant theoretical foundation is the concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). Its founder, C. Ray Jeffery, scientifically demonstrated that the environment can encourage or restrict human behavior, linking security to architectural, engineering, and spatial planning solutions.

O. Newman’s concept of “defensible space” (the idea of creating an area that residents can defend, monitor, and feel responsible for) emphasizes the need to transform facility territories into

self-protective spaces through natural surveillance, territoriality, controlled access, and the strengthening of a sense of ownership.

In our view, the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design ensure not only reactive responses by security services in guarded facilities, but also early-stage prevention. Proper environmental design conserves security personnel resources, reduces dangerous blind spots, and enhances the natural level of surveillance.

T. Crowe systematized the CPTED theory and proposed a practical “toolkit” consisting of natural surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and maintenance/management. These principles ultimately align closely with situational crime prevention.

P. Cozens, G. Saville, and J. Cleveland summarized empirical studies on the effectiveness of CPTED, demonstrating that proper environmental design in transport intersections, commercial areas, and residential neighborhoods simultaneously reduces crime dynamics.

G. Saville and J. Cleveland, in the “second generation of CPTED,” identify social cohesion and the creation of a sense of ownership and responsibility within communities as central factors.

In our view, for guarded facilities (such as banks, strategic infrastructure, and large shopping and entertainment complexes), the first-generation CPTED principles constitute a mandatory “minimum standard,” while second-generation ideas serve as an important “social and psychological supplementary resource” for stabilizing security. This is because facilities are continuously associated with flows of people, and therefore not only technology, but also a “culture of a safe environment” becomes an integral link in the preventive chain.

In his research (particularly using residential and retail environments as examples), R. Armitage focuses on the decision-making logic of offenders. Armitage demonstrates that the greatest deterrents for offenders are not physical difficulties, but rather the “risk of detection” and the “probability of failure.” Accordingly, organizing a territory or guarded facility in a manner that ensures control and rapid response proves to be particularly effective.

In our opinion, R. Armitage’s methodology of “assessment from the offender’s perspective” is highly applicable for auditing preventive mechanisms in guarded facilities. Facility security should be evaluated not only by the number of posts or cameras installed, but also by the extent to which these measures are perceived as real barriers through the eyes of a potential offender.

At the same time, it should be noted that the specific nature of guarded facilities is extensively addressed in the theory of administrative and legal regimes. V. A. Seleznev interprets the “administrative and legal regime of a guarded facility” as a comprehensive system that

integrates special powers, access and exit rules, administrative coercive measures, and interaction among relevant actors.

Y. V. Seregin differentiates between the concepts of security, protection, guarding, and anti-terrorist defense, emphasizing that preventive mechanisms at facilities pursue distinct legal objectives.

In N. V. Shchedrin's "legal theory of security measures," prevention is viewed not merely as an organizational activity, but as an independent legal institution that proactively neutralizes social danger through legal regime instruments.

In our view, these administrative and legal perspectives contribute to the proper modeling of security service activities within the framework of national legislation. While situational prevention and CPTED provide practical answers to the question "what should be done?", the theory of administrative and legal regimes addresses the question "how should this be done, and on what legal authority?"

Thus, in academic discourse, the effectiveness of offense prevention mechanisms in guarded facilities is interpreted in an integrative manner: limiting opportunities (Clarke), strengthening the guardian function (Cohen–Felson), designing safe environments (Jeffery–Newman–Crowe–Cozens–Saville), and guaranteeing all of these through legal regimes and administrative coercive instruments (Seleznev, Seregin, Shchedrin). In our opinion, systematizing these approaches within the framework of a dissertation provides the most reliable scientific and methodological basis for assessing the real effectiveness of preventive activities carried out by security services.

From the perspective of ensuring public safety, it is appropriate to interpret situational prevention, routine activity theory, CPTED, administrative and legal regime theory, as well as technical and multi-actor cooperation approaches not in isolation, but as a unified "integrative preventive system."

In our view, public safety is a systemic phenomenon that encompasses not individual facilities or isolated offenders, but entire territories, infrastructure, and patterns of everyday life. Therefore, each theory should constitute a specific block within this system. Clarke's situational prevention aimed at "limiting opportunities" serves to reduce favorable conditions for crime in public spaces and around guarded facilities, while Cohen and Felson's routine activity theory theoretically substantiates the necessity of continuous and effective participation of "capable guardians" (police, national guard, security services, community representatives, video surveillance operators, and others) across all areas relevant to public safety.

We believe that CPTED and the concept of “defensible space” connect these two blocks directly to the physical environment and urban planning. They require streets, parks, shopping centers, transport hubs, residential neighborhoods, and guarded facilities to be designed in such a way that opportunities for crime are reduced for potential offenders, while comfort and safety for individuals and citizens are enhanced.

In our opinion, these theories manifest themselves within the public safety system as complementary blocks in the following manner: first, the “opportunity-reduction” (situational) block, aimed at reducing favorable conditions for offenses through access control, isolation of high-risk zones, video surveillance, alarm systems, lighting, physical barriers, and visible security zones in transport infrastructure, shopping and entertainment venues, educational institutions, banks, and other guarded facilities; second, the “guardianship and monitoring” (routine activity) block, which ensures continuous observation, patrol, and rapid response by public safety actors (law enforcement agencies, the national guard, private security organizations, community systems, and local self-governance bodies) across territories and facilities. Here, the concept of a “capable guardian” includes not only human factors, but also dispatcher centers integrated with technical systems and the principle of “intelligent monitoring”; third, the CPTED and defensible space block, which encompasses natural surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, fostering a sense of ownership over shared spaces, and eliminating “blind spots” through architectural and landscape solutions. In our view, this block represents the “most cost-effective yet most sustainable preventive tool” in ensuring public safety, as a properly designed environment reduces the subsequent need for expensive force-based measures.

At the same time, it is insufficient to rely solely on theoretical and architectural approaches. All of these must be encompassed by a robust administrative and legal regime. As emphasized by administrative law scholars (V. A. Seleznev, Y. V. Seregin, N. V. Shchedrin, and others), preventive mechanisms in ensuring public safety function effectively only when they are transformed into a “regime” through clearly defined legal restrictions, permit systems, administrative coercive measures, delineated powers of actors, and a system of responsibility.

We believe that clearly defining the concept of a “regulated territory” both in general public spaces and in specially guarded facilities constitutes the legal foundation of public safety. In this context, specialized legislation such as the Law “On the Prevention of Offenses,” the “Public

Safety Concept,” and the Law “On Security Activities” collectively form a unified regulatory and legal framework.

In our view, it is precisely within this context that situational, routine activity, and CPTED elements cease to be merely “optional recommendations” and instead become mandatory requirements imposed by the state, while standards established in legislation oblige public safety actors to implement specific preventive measures in practice.

The public safety system conceptually relies on an additional dimension—the block of multi-actor cooperation and social partnership. Here, the central focus is placed on cooperation mechanisms among private security structures, territorial internal affairs units, the National Guard, local community institutions (mahalla), educational institutions, and civil society organizations. In our opinion, classical criminological theories (Clarke, Felson, Jeffery, Newman, and others) do not fully answer the question “who does what?” in ensuring public safety. These theories explain the essence of preventive measures, but leave issues of task distribution, information exchange, and legal responsibility among actors insufficiently specified. Therefore, within the scope of this research, we consider it promising to develop an “inter-agency cooperation model” based on these theories and to institutionalize a “preventive contour” among public safety actors—for example, the prompt and regulated exchange of information regarding dangerous individuals, suspicious behavior, and “hot spots” identified within guarded facilities.

We believe that within such an integrative approach, public safety transforms from a system focused solely on punishment and reactive measures into a multi-layered preventive paradigm based on proper spatial planning, opportunity reduction, strengthening the guardian function, tightening legal regimes, integrating technical means, and engaging the population.

In conclusion, it can be stated that in the field of public safety, the priority lies not in the “competition” of different theoretical approaches, but in their complementarity. In our view, the ideological foundation of the research can be summarized as follows: first, the modern model of ensuring public safety consists of situational measures aimed at limiting opportunities for offenses; second, the routine activity logic that strengthens guardianship and monitoring mechanisms; third, CPTED and “defensible space” principles that ensure prevention through environmental design; fourth, an administrative and legal regime that elevates all of these measures to the level of mandatory standards through lawful instruments;

fifth, the formation of a unified management system based on inter-agency and community cooperation.

Only under these conditions, in our view, will preventive mechanisms applied within guarded facilities become not merely a local practice, but an integral component of public safety policy at the city, regional, and national levels.

At this stage, it is appropriate to examine in greater detail how the theoretical approaches outlined above operate in practice, using statistical data from the city of Tashkent for the period 2019–2025 (as of November 19, 2025). The following analysis aims specifically to link this empirical base with situational prevention, routine activity theory, CPTED, and administrative and legal regime theories.

Over recent years, the preventive capacity of security services has been developing progressively. In particular, this process can be analyzed using the example of the city of Tashkent over the period 2019–2025.

The dynamics of administrative offense cases handled by security service units in Tashkent demonstrate the following pattern:

2019	–	a	total	of	24	administrative	cases;
2020	–	a	total	of	55	administrative	cases;
2021	–	a	total	of	336	administrative	cases;
2022	–	a	total	of	521	administrative	cases;
2023	–	a	total	of	5,798	administrative	cases;
2024	–	a	total	of	1,661	administrative	cases;
2025 (up to November 19) – a total of 4,598 administrative cases.							

These figures indicate that in 2019–2020, the preventive activity of security services operated within a narrow scope, following a “traditional” model focused primarily on internal order and property protection within facilities.

In 2021–2022, legislative changes (including the Law “On Security Activities” and the expansion of administrative powers granted to National Guard bodies) led to an expansion of administrative jurisdiction, and the preventive mechanism increasingly acquired an institutional character.

The sharp increase observed in 2023 should not be interpreted merely as a “sudden rise in offenses,” but rather as a result of the large-scale formal registration of latent offenses—that is, as an expansion of the actual coverage of preventive activities. The subsequent decrease in 2024 indicates that preventive measures had begun to yield tangible effects. The renewed increase

recorded in 2025 (as of November) reflects the active implementation by security services of environmental, sanitary, and public order control functions.

From a theoretical perspective, this dynamic fully corresponds to Clarke's "opportunity as a root cause" principle and Cohen and Felson's routine activity logic. As powers expand, the capable guardian (security personnel combined with technical monitoring) becomes involved in a greater number of situations, resulting in the identification and formal registration of offenses that were previously hidden or overlooked.

Statistical data reflect not only numerical changes, but also the types of risks that predominate within guarded facilities. In this regard, a structural analysis by articles of the Code of Administrative Responsibility is particularly significant.

During 2019–2020, the preventive profile reflected a traditional security model. In 2019, nearly all of the 24 cases were associated with Article 61, Part 1 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility (minor theft). This indicates that the primary perceived risk within guarded facilities was property-related offenses, particularly petty theft.

The structure of the 55 cases recorded in 2020 differs somewhat. Specifically, 20 cases fell under Article 61, Part 1 (minor theft), 34 cases under Article 185¹, Part 1 (illegal circulation of pyrotechnic products), and 1 case under Article 194¹, Part 1 (failure to comply with a lawful demand).

This demonstrates that a new component—illegal handling of pyrotechnic, explosive, and flammable substances—was added to the risk profile of guarded facilities. From the perspective of situational prevention, this reinforces the need to restrict opportunities for storing and handling hazardous materials within and around protected sites.

Administrative offenses recorded in 2021–2022 can be assessed as being dominated by non-compliance with lawful demands and violations of established regimes. In particular, the majority of the 336 cases recorded in 2021 fall under Article 194¹, Part 1 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility (more than 200 cases), while the remaining cases relate to Article 61, Article 185¹, Article 195 (resistance to officials in the performance of their official duties), and Article 210¹ (violation of access and exit regimes at especially important and categorized facilities, or failure to fulfill obligations related to ensuring the protection of such facilities). A similar pattern is observed in 2022, where Article 194¹, Part 1 remains dominant among the 521 cases, followed by Articles 61, 210¹, and 185¹.

This indicates that the principal problem within the territories of guarded facilities during this period was non-compliance with lawful instructions and disregard for facility regimes. From

the perspective of routine activity theory, prevention at this stage was strengthened through the institutional reinforcement of the role of the “capable guardian” (security personnel). The ability to initiate administrative proceedings against individuals who fail to comply with lawful demands provides security services with an additional enforcement resource, thereby enhancing their preventive capacity.

In 2023, environmental, sanitary, and urban maintenance violations may be identified as the leading risks. The structure of the 5,798 cases recorded in 2023 is as follows: approximately 4,100–4,200 cases under Article 91¹, Part 1 (disposal of solid household and construction waste in unauthorized locations, as well as discharge of liquid household waste); 800–900 cases under Article 161 (violation of rules for urban and settlement improvement); 300–400 cases under Article 187, Part 1 (consumption of alcoholic beverages in public places and disorderly conduct); more than 200 cases under Article 61 (minor theft); and several dozen cases under Articles 88 (violation of atmospheric air protection rules), 192 (violation of noise and public tranquility requirements), as well as Articles 194¹, 210¹, and others.

The emerging “risk profile” demonstrates that sanitation, waste management, cleanliness, urban maintenance, and negligent attitudes toward sidewalks and green areas became the primary objects of preventive attention within guarded facilities and their surrounding territories. From a CPTED perspective, such issues contribute to the transformation of environments into disorderly spaces perceived as “out of sight” and “belonging to no one.” Consequently, security services sought to neutralize these risks through administrative mechanisms.

In 2024–2025, environmental safety and air protection can be assessed as leading risks. Although the total number of cases in 2024 decreased to 1,661, Articles 91¹ and 161 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility continued to occupy leading positions in the offense structure. A significant number of cases were also recorded under Articles 61, 88, and 187. This suggests that previously implemented measures aimed at environmental cleanliness and order have produced tangible results, yet certain risk factors remain unresolved.

As of November 19, 2025, a notable shift in the structure of offenses can be observed. The largest number of cases were recorded under Article 88, Part 1 (violation of atmospheric air protection requirements), followed by Articles 91¹, 161, and 187, as well as Articles 91², 61, 185², 192, and 210¹.

This trend indicates that within the operation of guarded facilities—particularly industrial, construction, and transport infrastructure sites—risks related to air pollution, malfunctioning filtration and gas-cleaning systems, and excessive emissions into the atmosphere have moved to

the forefront. Accordingly, the preventive activity of security services is evolving into a comprehensive model that encompasses not only “physical security,” but also “environmental security.”

The distribution of administrative cases across the districts of Tashkent also represents an important source for assessing the effectiveness of public safety and preventive mechanisms implemented by security services.

The analysis shows that in 2023, higher levels of administrative case activity were recorded in the Chilonzor, Mirzo Ulugbek, Olmazor, Sergeli, Yunusabad, and Yakkasaray districts. In 2024, the heaviest administrative burden fell on the Sergeli, Mirzo Ulugbek, Chilonzor, and Yangihayot districts. In 2025, Sergeli, Olmazor, Yangihayot, and Mirobod districts occupied leading positions.

The common characteristic of these districts lies in the high density and diversity of guarded facilities, including large shopping and entertainment centers, transport hubs, logistics warehouses, industrial enterprises, banking and financial infrastructure, strategic facilities, and other critical objects, which are predominantly concentrated in these areas. From the perspective of Newman’s defensible space concept and CPTED theory, such territories represent a special type of environment characterized by high population flow, intensive transit movement, and a heterogeneous contingent of visitors with diverse purposes.

For this reason, ensuring effective natural surveillance, strengthening access control, fostering territorial reinforcement and a sense of ownership, and maintaining a high level of environmental management become decisive factors in determining the effectiveness of preventive mechanisms implemented by security services in these districts.

When comparing the above statistical data with theoretical models, the following scientific conclusions may be drawn.

First, the predominance of Articles 61 and 185¹ of the Code of Administrative Responsibility during 2019–2020 reflects the need to restrict opportunities for minor theft and violations related to pyrotechnics within guarded facilities. The high proportion of Article 194¹ in 2021–2022 demonstrates the emphasis on ensuring public safety through the enforcement of lawful demands. Meanwhile, the dominance of Articles 91¹, 161, 88, and 187 during 2023–2025 indicates a shift toward the implementation of measures aimed at protecting and preserving the natural and built environment.

Second, security service personnel, video surveillance operators, dispatch centers, alarm systems, and facility administrations jointly form an effective model of the “capable guardian.” The dynamics of administrative protocols themselves indicate that, in the presence of such a

“capable guardian,” offenses in routine situations are often prevented or interrupted at an early, incomplete stage.

Third, prevention under Articles 91¹, 161, and 88 of the Code of Administrative Responsibility essentially represents the elimination of environments conducive to offenses through environmental cleaning, urban improvement, and compliance with waste management and air protection regulations. Cleanliness around facilities, well-lit areas, properly designed access points, correctly positioned video surveillance cameras, and strategically located control checkpoints collectively represent the practical embodiment of CPTED principles.

Fourth, as emphasized by scholars such as V.A. Seleznev, Yu.V. Seregin, and N.V. Shchedrin, the effectiveness of prevention is closely linked to an administratively regulated legal regime guaranteed by law. Statistical data from Tashkent demonstrate that, with the expansion of administrative powers granted to the National Guard authorities, prevention has evolved into a genuinely legal mechanism. The inevitability of lawful consequences in the event of violations is ensured, which also serves as a deterrent signal for individuals inclined toward future offenses.

Based on a synthesis of statistical data from Tashkent and the above theoretical approaches, the following general conclusions may be formulated.

First, during the period from 2019 to 2025, the activity of security services within guarded facility territories has evolved from traditional physical guarding toward a comprehensive preventive model.

Second, the predominance of Articles 91¹, 161, 88, and 187 in the structure of administrative offenses indicates that security services are increasingly emerging as key actors in the early detection and restriction of environmental, sanitary, and public order-related risks.

Third, the identification of “risk hotspots” at the district level reveals the necessity of targeted resource allocation, optimization of guard posts and patrol routes, and the full integration of CPTED principles into infrastructure planning.

Thus, theoretical models (situational crime prevention, routine activity theory, CPTED, and administrative-legal regimes) and empirical data from Tashkent jointly and coherently demonstrate the effectiveness of mechanisms for preventing offenses within guarded facility territories. Based on these statistical and theoretical foundations, the subsequent paragraphs substantiate the advisability of implementing the following organizational and legal measures aimed at further enhancing the effectiveness of security service activities.

In particular:

First, it is advisable to introduce the following concepts into the system of basic definitions of Article 3 of the Law “On Security Activities”:

guarded facility territory — an area where buildings, structures, physical and electronic infrastructure elements protected by state bodies and other entities in accordance with the procedure established by this Law are located, as well as adjacent territories (alleys, parking lots, pedestrian pathways, internal roads and sites, green areas), within which a special regime is established for the purpose of ensuring public safety;

restricted (regime) territory — a set of public places and infrastructure areas related to a guarded facility territory, within which special rules, restrictions, and obligations предусмотрены by this Law and other legislative acts are in force.

Second, it is proposed to supplement the Law “On Security Activities” with a new Article 61 as follows:

Article 61. Order within guarded facility territories and restricted territories

The precise boundaries of guarded facility territories and restricted territories shall be determined by the owner (user) of the facility in coordination with the security authority and shall be recorded in the regime passport.

Security services shall conduct monitoring of compliance with environmental, sanitary, urban improvement, and public order regulations within guarded facility territories and restricted territories; draw up administrative offense reports in cases provided for by the Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Uzbekistan; and notify relevant state authorities, in accordance with the established procedure, of identified offenses and risk factors.

Third, it is proposed to supplement the Law “On Security Activities” with a new Article 71 as follows:

Article 71. Categorization of guarded facilities by risk level

Guarded facilities shall be categorized by risk level depending on their potential impact on public safety, citizens’ life and health, national defense capability, and economic and environmental security.

The criteria for risk categorization, the list of risk categories, and the minimum public safety requirements for each category shall be approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The risk level of a guarded facility shall be taken into account when determining its security regime, the number of security personnel and technical means, the placement of video surveillance and other monitoring systems, as well as the form and frequency of preventive measures.

Fourth, it is proposed to introduce the following amendments and additions to the Code of Administrative Responsibility:

First, Article 32 (Aggravating circumstances of administrative liability) shall be supplemented with a new clause 7 of the following content:

“7) commission of an offense within a legally established guarded facility territory or restricted territory.”

(Subsequent clauses shall be renumbered accordingly.)

Second, Article 88 (Violation of atmospheric air protection requirements) shall be supplemented with a second part as follows:

The offense provided for in part one of this article, if committed within a legally established guarded facility territory or restricted territory, shall entail the imposition of a fine ranging from ten to fifteen times the base calculation amount.

(Subsequent parts shall be renumbered accordingly.)

Third, Article 91¹ (Disposal of solid household and construction waste in unauthorized locations, as well as discharge of liquid household waste) shall be supplemented with a fourth part as follows:

If the offense provided for in part one of this article is committed within a legally established guarded facility territory or restricted territory and is repeated within one year, it shall entail the imposition of a fine ranging from twenty to thirty times the base calculation amount.

Fourth, Article 161 (Violation of urban and settlement improvement rules) shall be supplemented with a second part as follows:

The offense provided for in part one of this article, if committed within a legally established guarded facility territory or restricted territory, shall entail the imposition of a fine ranging from nine to fourteen times the base calculation amount.

Fifth, taking into account that the Main Security Directorate is designated as a special authorized subject under code 381 in the Classifier of bodies authorized to consider cases of administrative offenses (approved as an annex to Resolution No. 322 of the Cabinet of Ministers dated May 3, 2018), it is proposed to supplement the Code with a new Article 194² as follows:

Article 194². Failure to comply with lawful demands of security service personnel

Failure to comply with lawful demands or instructions issued by security service personnel within the scope of their authority, or obstruction of their lawful activities, shall entail the imposition of a fine ranging from five to twelve times the base calculation amount. If the same offense is committed repeatedly within one year after the application of an administrative penalty,

it shall entail a fine ranging from twelve to thirty times the base calculation amount or administrative arrest for up to fifteen days.

Sixth, it is proposed to supplement the Code with a new Article 195² as follows:

Article 195². Resistance to the performance of official duties by security service personnel

Public calls in any form to disobey lawful demands related to the performance of official duties by security service personnel, as well as the deliberate dissemination of false information intended to provoke mass disobedience toward security service personnel, shall entail the imposition of a fine ranging from three to twenty times the base calculation amount or administrative arrest for up to fifteen days.

Finally, it is necessary to develop and adopt a Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan “On measures to introduce the categorization of guarded facilities by risk level and principles of crime prevention through environmental design” (a draft resolution is attached).

In conclusion, the analysis of offense prevention mechanisms within guarded facility territories demonstrates that their overall direction has been correctly chosen. However, it also clearly indicates the need for further improvement through strengthened normative and legal consolidation, deeper integration with architectural and urban planning practices, and enhanced interagency coordination in accordance with modern public safety requirements.

List of used literature

1. **Administrative Procedures Act.** — Republic of Korea, 2017.
2. **Civil Defense Framework Act.** — Republic of Korea, 2021.
3. **Code de la Défense.** — République Française, 2004.
4. **Code de la Sécurité Intérieure.** — République Française, 2012.
5. **Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Republic of Uzbekistan.** — Tashkent: Adolat, 2023.
6. **Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.** — Tashkent: Adolat, 2023.
7. **European Commission.** Public Security and Crisis Management Framework. — Brussels, 2021.
8. **Farmer, D. J.** Public Administration in Perspective: Theory and Practice through Multiple Lenses. — New York: Routledge, 2010.

9. Guidelines on Democratic Control of Armed Forces. — Vienna, 2019.
 10. Islomov, Z. M. The Legal Status of the National Guard of Uzbekistan and Its Role in Public Safety. — Tashkent: Akademnashr, 2022.
 11. **Janowitz, M.** The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. — New York: The Free Press, 1960.
 12. Kadirov, B. A. Administrative and Legal Activities of Law Enforcement Agencies. — Tashkent: TGYuI Publishing House, 2021.
 13. Karimov, I. The Role of the National Guard in Ensuring State and Public Security. — Journal of Public Safety and Jurisprudence, No. 4, 2022.
 14. Khayrullaev, M. N. Management System of the National Guard of Uzbekistan and Analysis of Foreign Experience. — Law and Security, No. 2, 2023.
 15. **Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On the National Guard.”** — Astana, 10 January 2015.
 16. Law No. 2803 on the General Command of the Gendarmerie. — Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, 1983.
 17. Law No. 5326 on Misdemeanors. — Republic of Turkey, 2005.
 18. Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the National Guard. — Tashkent, 2017.
 19. **National Defense Act.** — United States, 1916.
 20. **National Defense Act.** — Republic of Korea, 2022.
 21. **Posse Comitatus Act.** — United States Code, Title 18, §1385, 1878.
 22. **Shields, P. M.** Civil–Military Relations and Democratic Control. — Public Administration Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, 2014.
- United Nations (UN).** Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity. — New York, 2020.