

**BEST PRACTICES OF NATIONAL GUARD–TYPE UNITS OF FOREIGN STATES IN
PREVENTING OFFENCES WITHIN PROTECTED FACILITIES**

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Abstract: This paper provides a comparative legal and institutional analysis of the best practices developed by national guard–type units of foreign states in preventing offences within the territories of protected facilities. Using the examples of the Italian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, the Turkish Gendarmerie, the National Guard of the Russian Federation and other similar units, the study examines their legal status, mandates, preventive functions and the use of administrative measures in maintaining security at guarded sites. Particular attention is paid to the introduction of modern prevention models based on community policing and risk-based approaches, including video surveillance systems, access control and restriction, technical security means, information-analytical monitoring, public participation and public–private partnership mechanisms in ensuring the security of critical infrastructure and other protected facilities. On the basis of this analysis, the paper develops scientifically grounded proposals and policy recommendations aimed at improving the activities of the National Guard and guarding services in the Republic of Uzbekistan in the field of prevention of offences within protected facilities.

Keywords: National guard–type units; protected facility; prevention of offences; public safety; comparative legal analysis; risk-based approach; community policing; public–private partnership; critical infrastructure security; democratic policing.

**ХОРИЖИЙ ДАВЛАТЛАРНИНГ МИЛЛИЙ ГВАРДИЯ ТИПИДАГИ
БЎЛИНМАЛАРИНИ ҚЎРИҚЛАНАДИГАН ОБЪЕКТЛАР ХУДУДИДА
ХУҚУҚБУЗАРЛИКЛАРНИНГ ОЛДИНИ ОЛИШ СОҲАСИДАГИ ИЖОБИЙ
ТАЖРИБАЛАРИ**

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Аннотация: Мазкур ишда хорижий давлатларнинг миллий гвардия типигаги бўлинмалари кўриқланадиган объектлар ҳудудида ҳуқуқбузарликларнинг олдини олиш соҳасида тўплаган ижобий тажрибалари қиёсий-ҳуқуқий ва институционал жиҳатдан таҳлил қилинади. Италия Карабинерлари, Испания Гвардия Сивили, Нидерландия Қироллик Марехаусеси, Туркия Жандармерияси, Россия Росгвардияси каби махсус бўлинмалар мисолида кўриқланадиган объектлар хавфсизлигини таъминлашда уларнинг ҳуқуқий мақоми, ваколатлари, профилактик функциялари, маъмурий таъсир чоралари ҳамда “community policing” ва рискларга асосланган ёндашув каби замонавий моделлари ўрганилади. Шунингдек, видеокузатув, кириш-чиқишни чеклаш тизимлари, техник муҳофаза воситалари, ахборот-аналитик мониторинг, жамоатчилик иштирокини таъминлаш, давлат–хусусий шериклик механизмлари каби самарали профилактика усуллари таҳлил қилинади. Тадқиқот натижалари асосида янги Ўзбекистон шароитида Миллий гвардия ва Кўриқлаш бош бошқармаси фаолиятини такомиллаштириш, кўриқланадиган объектлар ҳудудида ҳуқуқбузарликларнинг олдини олиш самарадорлигини ошириш бўйича илмий асосланган таклиф ва тавсиялар ишлаб чиқилади.

Калит сўзлар: Миллий гвардия типигаги бўлинмалар; кўриқланадиган объект; ҳуқуқбузарликларнинг олдини олиш; жамоат хавфсизлиги; қиёсий-ҳуқуқий таҳлил; рискларга асосланган ёндашув; community policing; давлат–хусусий шериклик; критик инфратузилма хавфсизлиги; демократик полиция.

ПОЗИТИВНЫЙ ОПЫТ ПОДРАЗДЕЛЕНИЙ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ГВАРДИИ ЗАРУБЕЖНЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В СФЕРЕ ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЯ ПРАВОНАРУШЕНИЙ НА ТЕРРИТОРИЯХ ОХРАНЯЕМЫХ ОБЪЕКТОВ

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Аннотация: В данной работе проводится сравнительно-правовой и институциональный анализ положительного опыта подразделений национальной гвардии зарубежных государств в области предупреждения правонарушений на территориях охраняемых объектов. На примере Карабиньери Италии, Гражданской гвардии Испании, Королевской военной полиции (Марешоссе) Нидерландов, Жандармерии Турции, Росгвардии и других структур рассматриваются их правовой статус, компетенция, профилактические функции, применение мер административного воздействия, а также внедрение современных моделей, основанных на принципах «community policing» и риск-

ориентированного подхода. Особое внимание уделяется использованию видеонаблюдения, систем контроля и ограничения доступа, технических средств охраны, информационно-аналитического мониторинга, механизмов участия гражданского общества и государственно-частного партнёрства при обеспечении безопасности охраняемых объектов. На основе анализа сформулированы научно обоснованные предложения и рекомендации по повышению эффективности деятельности Национальной гвардии и служб охраны в Республике Узбекистан по предупреждению правонарушений на территориях охраняемых объектов.

Ключевые слова: Подразделения национальной гвардии; охраняемый объект; предупреждение правонарушений; общественная безопасность; сравнительно-правовой анализ; риск-ориентированный подход; community policing; государственно-частное партнёрство; безопасность критической инфраструктуры; демократическая полиция.

As a logical continuation of the constitutional and legal reforms being implemented in Uzbekistan, and in order to ensure the execution of Presidential Decree No. PF-247 of November 15, 2022, entitled “On Measures to Increase the Effectiveness of the Activities of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Implementing the Development Strategy of New Uzbekistan,” new organizational and legal mechanisms aimed at the institutional improvement of lawmaking, law enforcement practice, and the legal support of reforms have been introduced.

In this context, with the objective of enhancing the effectiveness of the lawmaking process, ensuring its scientific and methodological grounding, and forming a legal policy aligned with the state’s strategic development priorities, Presidential Resolution No. PQ-462 of December 29, 2022, “On the Organization of the Activities of the Institute of Legislation and Legal Policy under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan,” was adopted. Pursuant to this Resolution, a state expert scientific research institution accountable directly to the President—the Institute of Legislation and Legal Policy—was established.

According to the Charter of this Institute, one of its priority tasks is to conduct systematic research in the field of forecasting the development of national legislation, making comprehensive use of advanced international experience, contemporary achievements of legal science, and the results of law enforcement practice, as well as to effectively integrate research findings into the process of preparing draft state programs in the sphere of lawmaking. These provisions, first and foremost, institutionally recognize the necessity of conducting lawmaking activities not solely

within the framework of national legal traditions, but on the basis of comparative legal analysis that incorporates the experience of developed countries and international standards.

In this regard, it should be noted that today national guard, gendarmerie, or military-police-type units within modern security architecture are no longer perceived merely as “force-based” actors. Rather, they function as specialized institutions responsible for ensuring public safety, protecting strategically important facilities, and preventing offenses. As noted by D. Lutterbeck, gendarmerie-type forces possess a “hybrid nature”: on the one hand, they rely on military discipline and centralized command, while on the other, they operate as internal security institutions accountable to civil society and parliamentary oversight. This dual character significantly elevates their role and responsibility in ensuring the security of guarded facilities.

Proceeding from this premise, under the conditions of New Uzbekistan, the study of the activities of the Main Directorate of Security—one of the key components of the public safety and crime prevention system—based on precisely such an institutional approach emerges as a highly relevant task. In particular, the development of security services in accordance with democratic policing standards, the improvement of the legal foundations of administrative powers related to crime prevention within guarded facility territories, and the strengthening of the institutional role of the Main Directorate of Security in the sphere of public safety have become pressing imperatives of the time.

To this end, an in-depth study of the positive mechanisms applied in the activities of security and guarding units in developed countries, and their incorporation into the process of modeling national legislation, is both scientifically justified from a theoretical perspective and of exceptional practical relevance.

In addition, the Guidebook on Democratic Policing developed by the OSCE emphasizes that, within the democratic policing model, the activities of such units are considered legitimate only when they are grounded in respect for human dignity, adherence to human rights and the rule of law, transparency and accountability to the public, as well as cooperation with citizens. Accordingly, the guarding activities of structures such as gendarmeries and national guards must also be regulated in legal and institutional terms in harmony with contemporary democratic policing standards.

In this regard, a comprehensive study of the specific mechanisms employed in developed countries by national guard or gendarmerie-type units to prevent offenses within guarded facility territories acquires significant scientific and practical importance for improving the activities of the Main Directorate of Security in New Uzbekistan. Such an analysis is particularly relevant for

revising its administrative and legal powers in line with democratic policing standards. In particular:

In France, the “Garde républicaine” model is in operation. Under this model, the Republican Guard (Garde républicaine) functions as a specialized military-police unit within the National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie nationale). Its primary tasks include the protection of the highest state authorities (the Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister’s residence at Matignon, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense), national palaces, and legislative buildings, as well as contributing to overall public security.

The French Republican Guard prevents offenses in the sphere of public order and the security of guarded facilities through several key mechanisms.

First, a segmented territorial security system is applied. At strategic facilities such as the Élysée Palace, Matignon, and the buildings of the National Assembly and the Senate, internal and external perimeters are clearly delineated, with distinct security regimes established for each perimeter. Within this framework, stationary control posts, dynamic patrol routes, and multi-level video surveillance systems operate in an integrated manner. Such a multi-layered security model enables the early identification of risk sources and allows preventive intervention before offenses are committed.

Second, an institutionalized mandatory risk assessment mechanism is employed. For each guarded facility under the authority of the Republican Guard, criteria are developed to assess threats related to terrorism, mass disturbances, vandalism, and other infrastructure-oriented risks. Based on these criteria, risk levels (for example, low, medium, high) are determined, and the deployment of personnel, special equipment, and organizational-tactical measures is adjusted accordingly. This approach transforms guarding services from a reactive force into a proactive crime prevention institution.

Third, the integration of protocol and security functions constitutes a defining feature of the model. The Republican Guard simultaneously performs ceremonial and honor guard duties at state events, provides official escorts (including mounted parades and high-level visits), and ensures the direct security of specific facilities and high-ranking officials.

The integration of ceremonial and protocol functions with security responsibilities requires personnel to demonstrate a high level of psychological resilience, advanced communication culture, and skills in maintaining public order during mass events. As a result, these units are formed not merely as “ceremonial troops,” but as professional police-military institutions performing strategic functions in the sphere of public security.

Thus, the example of the French Republican Guard demonstrates that a guarding service model based on segmented territorial security, institutionalized risk assessment, and the integration of protocol and security functions represents an effective mechanism for preventing offenses within guarded facility territories. A scientific and comparative analysis of these elements, and the development of their adapted variations for application within the activities of the Main Directorate of Security of the National Guard of the Republic of Uzbekistan, would contribute to the improvement of national legislation and the formation of a national guarding model aligned with democratic policing standards.

In Italy, a vivid example of such a model is the Comando Carabinieri per la Tutela del Patrimonio Culturale, a command specialized in the protection of cultural heritage sites. This structure has institutionalized the protection of cultural assets as a distinct sectoral direction, forming a vertically integrated and specialized network of governance. The existence within this command of units specializing in archaeology, the antiquities market, counterfeit artworks, and contemporary art demonstrates that the prevention and detection of offenses at cultural heritage sites can be organized not merely as a general police function, but as a sector-specific, yet centrally coordinated institutional subsystem.

At the same time, the introduction of the national “Leonardo” database has enabled the centralized collection of information on stolen and illegally imported or exported cultural property. By ensuring rapid information exchange between the Carabinieri, museums, customs authorities, and international organizations, this system allows the security of guarded facilities to be ensured through an information-technology-based platform.

An analysis of the experiences of **Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany** demonstrates that **legal clarity, sectoral classification, and risk-based management principles** play a decisive role in ensuring the security of protected facilities. In Spain, the activities of the **Guardia Civil** are clearly defined in organic laws such as **Organic Law No. 2/1986**, which explicitly delineates responsibilities for maintaining public order, counterterrorism, protection of state buildings and high-ranking officials, and the security of airports and communication routes. This legal precision provides a solid normative foundation for exercising protective powers without jurisdictional conflicts with other police forces.

At airports and within **free economic zones**, the Guardia Civil conducts integrated patrol and monitoring operations across terminals, perimeters, runways, baggage handling areas, and logistics centers. This approach establishes a “**single authority-comprehensive responsibility**” model in countering terrorism, smuggling, and organized crime, aligning security measures at

protected facilities with legally mandated special powers. Under high-risk conditions, the **Unidad Especial de Intervención (UEI)** serves as a specialized tactical-operational resource by conducting advance training for scenarios involving terrorism, hostage-taking, and mass disturbances within protected facilities, and by executing rapid interventions during crisis situations.

In the Netherlands, the activities of the **Koninklijke Marechaussee (KMar)** reflect a comprehensive **security and surveillance** model that integrates static guarding, identity verification, patrol functions, and threat analysis at royal palaces, the Prime Minister's residence, the Council of Ministers, major airports such as Schiphol, and other strategic facilities. This model conceptualizes the security of protected facilities not merely as physical protection, but as a system combining intelligence-led analysis and preventive measures. The specialization of **High Risk Security Platoons (HRSP)** in guarding high-risk facilities, supported by blast-resistant barriers, advanced protective equipment, and tactical training, illustrates a **differentiated protection model** based on assessed threat levels.

In Germany, the current framework is characterized by a clear allocation of responsibilities between the **Bundespolizei** and the **Bundeskriminalamt (BKA)** in the protection of federal buildings, embassies, and other critical sites. Furthermore, the **KRITIS national strategy**, developed by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, provides for the classification of critical infrastructures into sectors such as energy, transport, communications, and healthcare. For each sector, minimum security requirements and risk assessment criteria are established, enabling the protection of critical facilities through a **risk-based regulatory model**.

The experience of **Canada** demonstrates the necessity of conceptualizing the security of protected facilities within an integrated framework encompassing **personal protection, cybersecurity, and mission assurance**. Within the **Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)**, the **Protective Policing Program (PPP)** ensures the security of the Prime Minister, the Governor General, senior judiciary officials, and other protected persons, while simultaneously safeguarding Parliament, federal ministry buildings, and official residences through a unified system of analysis and planning. This approach establishes a functional interdependence between personal and facility security. Although the **Parliamentary Protective Service (PPS)** implements physical security measures within the parliamentary complex and Parliament Hill, institutional arrangements with the RCMP assign the latter a leading operational role, thereby closely integrating the security of protected facilities with the federal policing system.

In the **United States**, nationwide policy on the protection of critical infrastructure is articulated through strategic documents such as the **National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)** developed by the **Department of Homeland Security** and relevant agencies. State **National Guard** units are widely engaged as rapid response forces during threats to critical infrastructure, natural disasters, and mass disturbances, in accordance with the **Domestic Operations Law and Policy Handbook** and the **Critical Infrastructure Protection–Mission Assurance Assessment (CIP–MAA)** programs. **Quick Reaction Forces (QRF)** within state structures provide joint rapid response with law enforcement when threats to strategic facilities arise, while cybersecurity units assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure information systems and conduct mission assurance and risk assessment activities. This approach extends the protection of facilities beyond traditional physical guarding, advancing toward a **cyber-physical infrastructure security paradigm**.

The experience of **Türkiye** demonstrates the significance of ensuring the security of protected facilities through **military-disciplined governance, centralized sector-based protection, and close integration with the territorial defense system**. In Türkiye, the **Gendarmerie General Command (Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı)** operates in accordance with **Law No. 2803 on the Organization, Duties, and Powers of the Gendarmerie**, performing functions related to public order and security, crime prevention, and the protection of facilities in rural areas outside police jurisdiction. In doing so, the gendarmerie combines administrative-preventive, patrol, and guard duties with judicial (criminal-procedural) functions.

The continuous monitoring conducted by gendarmerie patrols and specialized protection units at major transport routes, bridges, dams, energy facilities, and government buildings, as well as the gendarmerie's participation in joint operations with military forces and national intelligence agencies in counterterrorism and organized crime efforts, contributes to ensuring the security of protected facilities through a **comprehensive and systemic approach**.

In the **Russian Federation**, the **Federal Service of the National Guard Troops (Rosgvardiya)** is responsible not only for internal security, public order, and counterterrorism, but also for the protection of important state facilities, special cargoes, engineering structures, and communication networks. These functions are explicitly designated as a distinct block within official regulatory documents. Within the Rosgvardiya system, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "**Okhrana**" operates as a centralized protection institution that develops sector-specific standardized security plans, assesses facility-related risks, and determines service conditions for

industrial sites, the fuel and energy complex, communications infrastructure, agro-industrial facilities, and civilian objects.

Academic and applied research increasingly characterizes Rosgvardiya as a **“linking element” between internal security and territorial defense**, interpreting the protection of strategic facilities as an integral component of national defense planning. This reinforces the tendency to view the security of protected facilities not as a separate sector, but as a **core element of the national security architecture**.

Thus, the results of the comparative analysis indicate that a number of common patterns and institutional principles are evident in the systems for ensuring the security of protected facilities developed in advanced states. First, particular attention should be given to the existence of **specialized, vertically managed structures** responsible for guarding and protecting facilities. Examples include the **Carabinieri TPC unit** specialized in protecting cultural heritage in Italy, the **Guardia Civil** in Spain, the **Koninklijke Marechaussee (KMar)** in the Netherlands, the **Bundespolizei** in Germany, protective and patrol services within the **Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)** in Canada, the **Gendarmerie** in Türkiye, **Rosgvardiya** in Russia, and the **National Guard** in Uzbekistan. These structures are organized on the basis of a vertical hierarchy, with their powers, accountability, and operational activities coordinated through a unified centralized command. Such an institutional model enables rapid security planning, efficient allocation of resources, and clear assignment of responsibility.

Second, the experience of developed countries demonstrates the critical importance of clearly defining, through precise legal norms, the **powers, jurisdictional scope, and boundaries of responsibility** of protection structures. Administrative coercive measures applied within protected facilities, special access regimes, inspection and documentation mechanisms, as well as the functional division of responsibilities among internal affairs bodies, national guards, defense institutions, and other specialized services, are explicitly regulated by law. The transparency of jurisdictional boundaries not only limits inter-agency competition and duplication of authority, but also contributes to safeguarding human rights, enhancing accountability, and ensuring stability in law enforcement practice.

Third, **risk-based models** grounded in a detailed classification of protected facilities and infrastructures according to sectors, types of threats, and levels of strategic significance have been widely implemented. For example, within the framework of concepts such as **KRITIS** and **Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)** in Europe, sectors including energy, transport, communications, finance, information and communication technologies, defense industry, and

cultural heritage are designated as critical infrastructures. Correspondingly, differentiated regimes of protection, control, monitoring, and emergency preparedness are established for each category. Integrated security platforms, such as **Leonardo**, aim to provide comprehensive protection by harmonizing technical, information-communication, and organizational measures. In this context, risk assessment, scenario-based forecasting, and priority-oriented resource allocation are reinforced by legal and regulatory foundations.

Fourth, a clear trend has emerged toward conceptualizing **personal security and facility security as an inseparable unified framework**. In Canada, within the **RCMP–PPS system**, the protection of government buildings and facilities is closely integrated with ensuring the safety of citizens, staff, and visitors. Similarly, by assigning **mission assurance** functions to National Guard–type units, exemplary practices have developed whereby protected facilities are safeguarded not only through perimeter security, but also through the comprehensive protection of personnel, visitors, critical information and technical assets, and logistical chains. This approach requires viewing human security, social stability, and the protection of strategic assets as interconnected elements of a holistic system.

Fifth, in the field of securing protected facilities, there is an observable deep integration of **civilian and military-disciplined components**, as well as the mechanisms of **public–private partnerships (PPP)**. In developed countries, for a number of facilities—such as transport terminals, commercial and cultural complexes, and financial centers—functions and responsibilities are clearly distributed among state protection services, private security companies, and facility administrations. Cooperative protocols, joint training exercises, and information-sharing arrangements are established, contributing to the optimization of state security resources, the rational use of private-sector capacities, and the strengthening of preventive measures at the local level.

These scientific conclusions serve as an important **theoretical and practical criterion** for improving the activities of the **National Guard’s Main Directorate of Security (MGDS)** in the context of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In particular, they substantiate the necessity of: **comprehensively classifying protected facilities** based on their legal status, sectoral affiliation, strategic significance, and threat levels, and accordingly establishing **differentiated security regimes** (standard, reinforced, special, emergency).

At the same time, the findings highlight the need to **reform information systems** on protected facilities and critical infrastructure, develop electronic threat profiles, and reconsider the **institutional and technical frameworks for information exchange** among the National Guard,

internal affairs bodies, emergency services, special communications services, and sectoral ministries.

Furthermore, comparative legal analysis demonstrates that the **current Article 5 (“Fundamental Principles of Security Activities”)** of the Law “On Security Activities,” which currently contains three principles, does **not sufficiently reflect contemporary security requirements or the experience of developed states**. Accordingly, it is appropriate to **revise this article**, expand its scope, and legally strengthen additional principles such as **risk-based approaches, differentiated protection of critical infrastructure, democratic policing standards, effective use of information technologies, interagency cooperation, and public-private partnerships**.

In other words, by **restructuring Article 5 based on scientific and theoretical foundations**, the principles of security activities can evolve from general legal norms into a **comprehensive regulatory framework** encompassing the **institutional, organizational, and information-technology foundations** of protected facility security. This, in turn, will help:

1. Align the MGDS’s activities with the practices of developed countries;
2. Harmonize national legislation with international approaches such as **KRITIS/CIP**;
3. Enhance the quality of legal regulation in ensuring the security of protected facilities.

Specifically, the revised Article 5 would read as follows:

Article 5. Fundamental Principles of Security Activities

Security activities are carried out on the basis of the **rule of law**, strict adherence to the Constitution and legislation, respect for human rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests, humanity, justice, transparency, and non-discrimination.

The Main Directorate of Security shall adhere to the following **special principles** in ensuring the security of protected facilities:

1. **Balance of public and national security interests** – Security measures shall be implemented in a manner that ensures alignment of state, societal, and individual interests without excessively restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms;
2. **Risk-based approach** – Assessment of protected facilities and infrastructure shall consider their significance, vulnerabilities, and potential threats, with protective measures differentiated accordingly;

3. **Sectoral and facility-specific protection** – Minimal security requirements shall be established for energy, transport, communications, state administration, military, and other strategic facilities, with protection aligned with classifications of critical infrastructure such as KRITIS/CIP;
4. **Integration of physical, technical, and cyber security measures** – Perimeter protection, access control points, video surveillance, alarms, information systems, and cybersecurity tools shall be employed as a unified system;
5. **Democratic policing standards and accountability** – Security activities shall be conducted according to democratic policing principles, ensuring respect for human rights, rule of law, transparency, accountability, and public participation;
6. **Interagency cooperation and public-private partnership** – Systematic collaboration and information exchange shall be ensured among internal affairs bodies, national security services, civil protection, local authorities, private security companies, and infrastructure operators;
7. **Effective use of information systems** – Information on protected facilities, threats, violations, and emergencies shall be maintained, analyzed, and applied for preventive purposes through integrated electronic databases and monitoring systems;
8. **Professionalism, specialized training, and service discipline** – Security personnel shall maintain high professional qualifications through continuous training based on international standards and best practices;
9. **Efficient use of resources and effectiveness** – Material, financial, and human resources shall be used economically, purposefully, and efficiently, with security measures evaluated based on performance indicators;
10. **Preparedness and resilience for emergencies** – Planning and exercises shall ensure readiness for natural and man-made emergencies, terrorism, and other high-risk situations, with rapid post-event recovery of systems;
11. **Priority of prevention** – The primary objective of security activities shall be the prevention of violations, terrorism, and other threats through early warning and risk reduction.

The Main Directorate of Security shall ensure that coercive measures are necessary and sufficient, adopt a non-violent approach toward citizens, and systematically monitor and improve the outcomes of security activities in accordance with the principles outlined in this Article.

These proposals will:

- Modernize the principles of security activities in accordance with contemporary security requirements and the experience of developed countries;
- Harmonize national legislation with international standards (democratic policing, KRITIS/CIP approaches, etc.);
- Significantly increase the **effectiveness of facility security** through a risk-based approach, sector-specific protection of critical infrastructure, and integration of physical, technical, and cyber measures;
- Institutionalize the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms and ensure the lawful, necessary, and proportionate application of coercive measures;
- Strengthen interagency cooperation and public–private partnerships, establishing unified coordination and information exchange among internal affairs bodies, national security agencies, local authorities, and private security entities;
- Enhance **planning, early threat detection, and preventive measures** through effective use of information systems and unified databases;
- Improve **resilience, preparedness, and strategic planning** for emergencies, terrorism, and natural and man-made threats, ensuring continuity and rapid recovery of protected facilities.

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